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Double Effect and the Ethical Significance of Distinct Volitional States
Those who employ double-effect reasoning (DER) i hold that the intended/foreseen distinction
(henceforth the i/f distinction) between what one causes with intention and what one causes with
foresight but without intention has ethical relevance. ii In what follows, I argue for the ethical
relevance of this distinction. First, I locate the distinction within double-effect reasoning (DER);
second, I present and reject a number of interpretations of its ethical relevance; third, and finally, I
argue for its ethical relevance.
Double-Effect Reasoning (DER)
A non-consequentialist employs DER to analyze an otherwise good action that causes
foreseen harm the causing of which is, on the face of things, not ethically in the clear. One uses DER
already convinced that: the act would be good if the foreseen harm were not inseparable from or
likely to attend it; the foreseen harm is likely to attend the act; and, finally, the act is the least harmful
action by which to realize the good at issue.iii Thus, DER is a non-consequentialist analysis of actions
that would be good and ethically in the clear but for the harm associated with them. Using DER one
attempts to determine if such an action is justifiable.
DER theorists consider acts such as tactical bombing that foreseeably harms non-combatants,
death-causing palliative analgesic administration to a terminally ill patient, and the surgical removal
of a life-threatening cancerous gravid uterus when the fetus is not viable.iv Thinkers contrast these
acts with terror bombing, voluntary active euthanasia, and craniotomy during pathological labor to
save the mother's life. For example, DER theorists argue that in a just war there is an absolute (or a
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great) ethical presumption against terror bombing while tactical bombing in which foreseeably but
not intentionally one harms noncombatants can be justified (or more easily justified than terror
bombing) -- if it meets the conditions set forth in DER.v These theorists assert that this is the case
even when terror and tactical bombing cause harm of the same magnitude with the same probability.
DER partially depends on the i/f distinction.vi One who employs DER makes three specific
claims about this distinction. First, that there is a distinction between the intended and the foreseen.
Second, that this distinction applies to the contrasted cases in such a way as to categorize, for
example, death in voluntary active euthanasia which comes about from a lethal injection of carbon
monoxide as intended while holding that the death of a terminally ill patient caused by palliative
morphine administration is foreseen but not intended. Third, one who uses DER holds that the
distinction has ethical significance. I argue for the ethical import of this distinction. Before doing so, I
consider a number of interpretations of its ethical significance which I understand to be mistaken.

The Ethical Relevance of the I/F Distinction: What It Is Not
One opponent of DER, H.L.A. Hart, understands proponents of DER to use the i/f distinction
to mark a difference in the probability of intended and foreseen consequences. Speaking of a
craniotomy and the removal of a cancerous gravid uterus -- both of which result in the death of a fetus
-- he says:
[I]f the craniotomy is contrasted with the removal of the womb containing the
foetus as a case of "direct" killing it must be on the basis that the death of the
foetus is not merely contingently connected with craniotomy as it is with the
removal of the womb containing it. But it is not clear that the supposition of
the survival of the foetus makes better sense in the one case than in the other.
(Hart, 1967, p. 13)
By "contingent" Hart means not causally or nomologically necessary. The death would be contingent
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if, according to the physical and biological laws obtaining, it were possible for the foetus to live.
According to Hart, if the i/f distinction has significance, it must be insofar as it marks a difference
between what is and what is not nomologically necessary. As Hart notes, however, if the fetus is not
viable and one removes the uterus, the fetus will die with nomological necessity. It is no more
nomologically possible for a non-viable fetus to live when the uterus has been surgically removed
from the mother than it is for a fetus to live when its head has been crushed. Yet, historically, those
who apply DER to the hysterectomy case employ it in cases when the fetus is nomologically certain
to die if the uterus is removed from the woman's body. Accordingly, the advocates of the i/f
distinction do not understand it to have ethical relevance insofar as it marks or coincides with a
difference in the probability of the harms.
Nonetheless, as Judith Lichtenberg notes, the i/f distinction may coincide with a difference in
the probability of the harms coming about. She says:
[I]t is not the mere difference between intending and not intending that makes
the moral difference. But one might nevertheless think that in general this
difference is correlated with other relevant factors. At the very least, one is in
general less likely to kill civilians if one is not trying to kill them.
(Lichtenberg, 1994, p. 360, original emphasis)
Lichtenberg holds that although the i/f distinction itself lacks ethical significance, it will often
coincide with an ethically important difference, namely, the varying probabilities of the intended and
foreseen consequences.vii Such varying degrees of probability have ethical relevance because the less
likely the harmful outcome, the more the action risks causing the outcome in contrast to causing it
outright.viii
Lichtenberg is correct. Often, foresight will be associated with risking harm in contrast to
causing harm with the high or certain degree of probability characteristic of intentional harming.
Nonetheless, I wish to argue the controverted and ultimately more interesting claim that the i/f
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distinction itself has ethical relevance and thus has significance even in those cases in which one
foresees that one will inevitably harm, cases such as death-causing palliative morphine
administration and hysterectomy of a cancerous gravid uterus when the fetus is not viable. Before
doing so, I will consider one more avenue for understanding the ethical relevance of the i/f distinction
which I find mistaken.
One might think that the i/f distinction's ethical relevance is to be found in its marking
varying degrees of responsibility which agents have for causing harm intentionally or with
foresight. ix For example, Lichtenberg thinks that the i/f distinction is proposed as marking an
ethically relevant difference between, for example, the terror bomber's and the tactical bomber's
varying degrees of responsibility for harming noncombatants. She understands proponents of DER to
use the i/f distinction to distinguish between the terror bomber's full responsibility and the tactical
bomber's partial responsibility for harming non-combatants. This, however, is not correct.x
If the terror or tactical bomber could claim not to have known about the harm to the
non-combatants, or to have been overwhelmed by force, then neither would be fully responsible or
even responsible at all for harming non-combatants. Such cases, however, are not those envisioned
by the advocates of DER. Lichtenberg correctly notes that, as the cases are usually proposed, the
terror and the tactical bombers both have full responsibility for the harm which comes to the
noncombatants. Proponents of DER ask us to consider cases in which both the terror and the tactical
bomber knowingly and without coercion cause the same harm to non-combatants with the same
degree of probability. Insofar as an agent's responsibility for a consequence is established by the
absence of force and his believing that the consequence would follow from his acting, there is no
difference between the degree of responsibility which the terror and the tactical bombers have for
harming non-combatants. If the i/f distinction has ethical relevance, it will not be found in the varying
degrees of responsibility which agents have for what they cause intentionally and what they cause
with foresight but without intention. I will argue that the i/f distinction marks ethically important
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differences in the volitional states of agents.

The Ethical Significance of the I/F Distinction
The debate concerning the ethical import of the distinction focuses on actions that cause
harms of the same magnitude with the same probability.xi Specifically, the controversy concerns
whether there is any ethical difference between an act in which harm is willed as a means and an act
in which harm is willed as a concomitant insofar as the agent would rather cause the harm than forgo
the realization of his end. There are a number of ways of articulating the ethical relevance of the i/f
distinction. I present what I take to be the most general and formal.xii First, a short digression on what
constitutes a human action is in order.
Human actions are a type of human causing. Human beings cause many things. For example,
humans exert gravitational force on Jupiter. This, however, is not an action, for it is not up to us
whether we exert this force. Yet, not all causings that are up to us are actions. For example, someone,
wanting decaffeinated coffee, might pour regular coffee into a cup inculpably thinking that the coffee
was decaffeinated. For something to be an action, the agent must know the relevant facts about what
he causes. Nonetheless, not all knowing causings are actions. For example, if Alice throws Joe
through a plate glass window, Joe may know what he causes as he hits the window and it shatters.
Yet, he may not at all want to shatter the window. In order for a human causing to be a human action,
the agent must cause willingly.xiii A human action is a knowing willing causing or a voluntary
causing. xiv This is the essential characteristic of all human actions. The point is relatively
non-controversial. Accordingly, I devote no further attention to it.
Jonathan Bennett, the most prominent opponent of the ethical import of the distinction says:
The facts that make behavior wrong ... do not include any that concern the
agent's state of mind (Bennett, 1995, p. 49).
By "the agent's state of mind" Bennett means the agent's beliefs and desires, what he thinks and
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wants. This position, however, is problematic. For, before determining what makes an action right or
wrong, a prior question needs to be answered: what makes an action action? What distinguishes a
nerve's twitching from a human's act, my twitching a nerve? Since knowing and willing make an
action to be an action, why cannot they also, at least partially, make an action good or bad and better
or worse?
Take an analogy. Say that a biologist defines a living organism as what can achieve
homeostasis; the living is delimited from the non-living by being able to control or make an
environment for itself. If the living is demarcated from the non-living by its ability to make or
influence an environment, differences in this ability will make for differences within biology, for
distinctions amongst living things. The general kinds of living things will be further classified in
accordance with this property. It does not lie dormant, never again to be relied upon once it has done
its initial job. If some animals have a greater capacity for homeostasis this marks a difference in the
world of the living between, for example, cold-blooded and warm-blooded animals. The general
point is that when a field of study is demarcated in accordance with a general property, if that property
admits of significant variations those variations will make for differences within the originally
delimited field.
Most every ethicist will agree that at its very outset ethics must distinguish human acts or
knowing willing causings from nerve twitches. The point of disagreement will be whether knowing
and willing generate differences in goodness and badness within the world of actions. If knowing and
willing themselves did not admit of differences there would be one indisputable reason for holding
that while knowing and willing do make actions actions they do not make actions good or bad. For if
knowledge and volition do not admit of differences, they offer no further differences to make a
difference in act evaluations. If these mental states admit only of breadth and extension and not of
depth and intensity, then once over the threshold of morality, the voluntary, which these states
constitute, we could put a consideration of such states to the side and look for the features in
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accordance with which one differentiated actions from one another as good or bad and better or
worse. On the other hand, if knowing and willing themselves admit of differences, then these
differences are differences in terms of which acts may be partially delimited as good or bad and better
or worse in conjunction with the good or bad states of affairs agents cause by acting.
Clearly, willing itself admits of differences. For example, the difference between willing
something in and for itself as one's end and willing something for the sake of something else, as a
means. Since willing is one of the two phenomena, the other being knowing, in terms of which the
good and bad effects of actions establish the goodness and badness of acts, it seems reasonable to
hold that the differences of which willing admits constitute differences in act- evaluation.xv
In fact, intending harm as an end is thought to differ in an ethically important way both from
intending harm as a means and from foreseeing but not intending harm as a means or end. Thinkers
on both sides of the debate concerning the ethical import of the i/f distinction agree on this point. For
example, opponents such as Jonathan Bennett and Judith Lichtenberg hold that intending harm as an
end in itself importantly differs from intending harm as a means to some end. For example, Bennett
asserts:
There is great moral significance in what a person intends as his end, what he
pursues for its own sake; but that is irrelevant to our topic. Neither the terror
nor the tactical bomber seeks or values civilian deaths for their own sake; each
may regard them as deplorable -- something he would not bring about if it
were detachable from his hastening of victory in this just war (Bennett, 1995,
p. 215).xvi
Bennett is correct. There is great moral significance in what a person intends as his end or for its own
sake. Proponents and opponents of the distinction's ethical significance agree that intending what is
bad as an end is ethically wrong because evil is to be avoided, not sought for its own sake. The
disagreement concerns willing harm as a means to some good end in contrast to voluntarily causing
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the same harm without intent.
Yet, the reason for distinguishing acts in which one intends harm as an end from acts in which
one either intends harm as a means or foresees but does not intend harm also grounds arguments for
distinguishing acts in which one intends harm as a means from acts in which one foresees but does
not intend harm. Take an hypothetical morality which primarily opposes the causing of pain. Willing
can be related to causing pain in the following ways. 1)Pain can be willed as an end, for example, if a
dentist sought to cause you pain for its own sake. 2)Pain can be willed for the sake of something else,
as a means, for example, if a dentist caused you pain in order to punish you for not brushing your teeth
or for bad breath. 3)Pain can be willed as an end and as a means, for example, if the dentist causes you
pain in order to punish you and just for the sake of causing you pain. 4)Pain can be willed as a
foreseen side-effect which is not wanted either for its own sake or for the sake of something else, but
which one would rather cause than forgo what one does will for its own sake or for the sake of
something else, for example, when a dentist drills a tooth without pain medication to which you are
allergic.xvii
In an ethics in which causing pain is to be avoided, causing pain just for the sake of causing
pain is clearly the worst thing one can do. As we have seen, this point is not controverted in the debate
concerning the i/f distinction's ethical relevance. Yet, in the hypothetical ethic why would causing
pain just for the sake of causing pain clearly be the worst thing one could do? This needs to be
explained. By attending to the various ways in which the will can relate to pain, one can explain why
willing it as one's end is the worst thing one can do. Because in terms of the intensity and depth of
which willing admits, willing something for its own sake is the most complete way of willing
something. Thus, to will for its own sake what is to be avoided is most intensely and most deeply
wrong.
If an act that has pain as its end is, other things being equal, worse than an act that has pain as
a means insofar as willing as an end is more intense than willing as a means, then there is also a
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relevant difference, other things being equal, between willing as a means and willing as a
concomitant or side-effect of what one does will as an end or means. That is, just as willing harm as
an end in itself is worse, other things being equal, than either willing harm as a means or willing harm
as a side-effect, so too willing harm as a means is worse, other things being equal, than willing harm
as a side-effect. This is precisely the point upon which the ethical relevance of the i/f distinction
depends.
Those who would argue that the difference between willing as a means and willing as a
concomitant lacks ethical import face a significant problem. For they must explain the strongly held
intuition that willing as an end differs from both willing as a means and willing as a concomitant in a
way which does not ground distinguishing willing as a means from willing as a concomitant. On the
other hand, those who hold the i/f distinction to be ethically significant can explain its import in terms
of the ethical relevance of volition. Such an account is consistent with the intuition that, other things
being equal, willing harm as an end is worse than willing harm either as an end or as a means.
Moreover, the account is in line with -- indeed follows from -- the very first distinction of any
recognizable ethics, namely, that it is what one knowingly willingly causes with which ethics
concerns itself.
Good and bad states of affairs lack ethical relevance in themselves. They acquire moral
significance from being knowingly and willingly caused by human beings. So, for example, if a rock
falls on you, this is bad, but not ethically bad or wrong. But, if you are harmless and I voluntarily
throw it at you, this has ethical significance and is ethically bad or wrong. How could whether a good
or bad state of affairs is knowingly willingly caused make all of the difference morally while further
differences of which willing admits make no difference at all to the evaluation of actions? Such a
position does not make sense. It is out of step with the very first distinction in any ethics -- that
between what is and what is not voluntarily caused. This fundamental distinction indicates the
grounds for holding that, other things being equal, there are important ethical differences between
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acts in which harm is willed as an end, acts in which harm is willed as a means, and acts in which
harm is willed as a concomitant of what is willed as an end or means. Insofar as DER depends upon
there being an ethically significant difference between the willing of harm as a means and the willing
of harm as a foreseen concomitant, it rests on firm philosophical ground.

NOTES
i.Henceforth I will use the phrase `double-effect reasoning' (DER) to
refer to what has been called, most commonly, the `Principle of Double
Effect', the `Doctrine of Double Effect' (Quinn, 1989), and the `Rule
of Double Effect' (Ramsey, 1978). There are a number of reasons to
do so. First, it is not a principle, but, principally, two criteria.
Second, its proponents and opponents sometimes reduce it to one
criterion (the i/f distinction). This reduction is reinforced by the
appellation `Principle'. `Doctrine' connotes an authoritative
teaching; this is less accurate and more confusing than `Principle'
insofar as DER stands on firm philosophical ground.
ii.See, for example, Jeff McMahan (1994); Joseph Boyle, (1980); and
Elizabeth Anscombe, (1970). These theorists understand the i/f
distinction to be ethically relevant in itself. As McMahan notes,
however, Warren Quinn (1989) proposes an account of DER in which the
i/f distinction does not have ethical importance in itself, but only
in conjunction with another's right (McMahan, 1994, p. 206).
iii.In contemporary discussions, DER is usually applied to cases in
which the harm is foreseen as an inevitable concomitant of realizing
the intended end. If such an act were accounted ethically in the clear,
a fortiori, so would an act similar in all respects, but for its
causing harm without inevitability.
iv.On bombing, see, for example, McMahan (1995); on death-causing
palliative analgesic administration, see, for example, Cavanaugh
(1996a); on hysterectomy, see, for example, O'Donnell (1991).
v.Traditionally, DER theorists are absolutists. However, some
nonabsolutists have presented and defended revised versions of DER.
DER theorists such as Boyle and Anscombe understand terror bombing
always to be ethically out of bounds. Revisionist theorists such as
McMahan and Quinn, speak in terms of there being a "stronger moral
presumption" against terror bombing than there is against tactical
bombing. By so speaking, they appear to hold that terror bombing is
for the most part ethically out of bounds, but not necessarily
absolutely out of bounds. Of course, logically, one could hold that
there is an absolute moral presumption against terror bombing while
asserting that there is a stronger moral presumption against it than
there is against tactical bombing. For a criticism of the revisionist
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use of DER, see Boyle (1991).
vi.DER is not based exclusively on the i/f distinction. Some prominent
critics of DER do not acknowledge this point sufficiently. For
example, Alan Donagan asserts that DER is simply a distinction between
what one intends and what one does not intend (Donagan, 1977, p. 122
and p. 164.) If this were the case, a second condition for DER would
be otiose. Yet, there is, generally speaking, one other condition of
DER which DER theorists present either in a deontological or in a
consequentialist form. Some theorists hold that the agent must have
as great an obligation (or a greater obligation) to realize the good
end as (or than) he has to avoid causing the bad effect while other
DER theorists hold either that the agent must cause as much good as
harm or greater good than harm. However DER theorists articulate the
second condition, they do not propose the first condition as
sufficient for judging an action which is good but for its causing
harm to be ethically in the clear.
vii.Jonathan Bennett (1995) follows Lichtenberg (1994) in holding that
the i/f distinction, although not ethically important in itself, may
be associated with this ethically important difference in the
probabilities of intended and foreseen consequences.
viii.There are good reasons to think that Aquinas, in his discussion
of a private individual's act of homicidal self-defense -- Summa
theologiae IIaIIae, q.64, a.7 the locus classicus of double effect
-- had something like risking death in mind. On this point, see
Cavanaugh, forthcoming.
ix.For a more detailed criticism of this -- mistaken -- interpretation
of the i/f distinction, see Dean Cocking and Justin Oakley, 1994.
x.Lichtenberg asserts:
I agree that the tactical bomber doesn't intend to kill civilians;
the question is rather whether he is as responsible or answerable for
these consequences as if he did. I acknowledge the conceptual
difference; the question is whether or not this makes a moral
difference. (Lichtenberg, 1994, p. 367, note 16, emphases added)
For a consideration of and response to Lichtenberg's criticism of
double effect, see Cavanaugh (1996b).
xi.Of course, although it is not attended to in most discussions of
the i/f distinction's ethical relevance, the distinction applies to
actions which bring about good and no harm. For example, in accordance
with the i/f distinction, one contrasts an act in which an agent
intentionally causes some good with an act in which an agent
foreseeably but not intentionally causes the same amount of good with
the same degree of probability. I owe this point to a conversation
with David O'Connor of the University of Notre Dame.
xii.For other articulations of the distinction's ethical relevance,
see Garcia (1993) and Cavanaugh, (1996b).
xiii.`Willingly' is ambiguous between rational desire and affective

11

desire. Affective desire for some outcome would be gladness that it
came about. Rational desire is the apprehension of some upshot as
being good and choiceworthy. One can rationally desire some outcome
as an end, as a means to something else, or as a side-effect which
one would rather bring about than forgo what one apprehends as being
good in itself. It is possible that one not affectively desire what
one rationally desires. For example, one may rationally, yet not
affectively desire to pay one's rent or mortgage. Similarly, one may
affectively desire what one does not rationally desire. For example,
one may be glad at a sunny day, yet one does not rationally desire
it insofar as we cannot cause sunny days. As I use the term, I mean
`willingly' to refer to rational desire. For a consideration of the
ambiguity between affective and rational desire and the confusion it
can cause in discussions of DER, see Finnis, 1991.
xiv.I understand knowing willing causing to include what one causes
in culpable ignorance and what one causes by omission.
xv.The cases contrasted in discussions of the i/f distinction and DER
do not involve differences in knowledge. Accordingly, I will not
discuss variations in epistemic states.
xvi.For a similar position, see Lichtenberg, 1994, p. 354.
xvii.Other ways in which one's will could relate to pain would be: 5)
not willing not to cause pain, for example, when a dentist does not
bother to try not to cause pain and 6) willing not to cause pain, for
example, when the dentist actually tries not to cause pain by
administering novocaine.
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